alism Again: The Rule of Rules ,
Uggs Outlet7.1. A Neo-Formalist Model of Practical Reasoning
7.1.1. Neo-Formalist Analytic
7.1.2. The Normative Case for Neo-Formalist Practical Reasoning
7.1.3. The Asymmetry of Authority
7.2. Neo-Formalist Jurisprudence: Rules and Law
CHAPTER 9: Positivism Challenged: Interpretation, Integrity, and Practical
Reasoning
1. Challengers
2. Principles and Controversy
2.1. The Province of Principles
2.1.1. Principles in practice
2.1.2. Positivism’s divided house
2.2. The Claims of Controversy
2.3. Positivist Conventions Feel the Sting of Controversy
3. Interpretive Jurisprudence
3.1 Against Archimedes
3.2 The Practice of Interpretation
3.2.1 The Interpretive Attitude
3.2.2 The Domain of Constructive Interpretation
3.2.3 The Dynamics of Constructive Interpretation: Data,
Louis Vuitton, Fit, and Appeal
3.3 Can there be a best theory?
4. Law as Integrity
4.1 An Interpretive Plateau
4.2 Conventionalism: A Challenger in Interpretive Clothing
4.3 Law’s Integrity
4.3.1 Political Responsibility,
Louis Vuitton Outlet, Justice, and Integrity
4.3.2 Law as Integrity
4.3.3 The Problem of the Wicked Legal System
4.4 Questioning Integrity
4.4.1 On the Possibility of Principle
4.4.2 Whose Integrity?
CHAPTER 10: The Incorporation Debate
1. Explaining the Difference Moral Principles Make
1.1. Elmer, The Duke, and Dr. Bonham
1.2. It’s a Mistake
1.3. A Case for Incorporation
1.4. Employed But Not Incorporated: Exclusive Legal Positivism 12
1.5. Incorporation by Common Practice of Argument: Inclusive Legal Positivism
1.6. Natural Law Perspectives on Incorporation
2. The Dialectic in the Positivist Camp
2.1. The Fiction of the Midas Touch
2.2. The Compatibility of Conventionalism and Incorporation
2.3. Implications of the Practical Dimension of Law
2.3.1. The Challenge of the Argument from Authority
2.3.2. Practical Guidance, Authoritative Directives, and Directed Powers
CHAPTER 11: Conventions and the Foundations of Law
1. Conventions,
Burberry Outlet, Conventionalisms,
Louis Vuitton, and Law
1.1 Law and Conventions
1.2. Normativity and Law’s Conventional Foundations
2. Humean Conventions
2.1. Conventions and Social Cooperation
2.1.1. Hume on the Conventions of Justice
2.1.2. Lewis Conventions
2.2. Humean Conventions and the Law
2.2.1. The Rule of Recognition as a Humean Convention
2.2.2. Humean Conventions and the Normativity of Law: Two Approaches
2.3. Humean Conventions Challenged
3. Conventions as Joint Commitments
3.1. Joint Commitments and Shared Cooperative Activities
3.1.1. Existence Conditions of Social Conventions
3.1.2. Conventions, Dispositions, and Reasons
3.2. Duties and Joint Commitments
3.2.1. Conventions as Collective Fiat
3.2.2. Shared Cooperative Activity,
Louis Vuitton UK, Obligation, and Disagreement
3.3. Commitments, Reasons, and Obligations: Some Questions
3.3.1. Dispositions, Commitments and Reasons
3.3.2. Do Joint Commitments Yield (the Right Kind of) Obligations?
3.3.3. On the Possibility of Fundamental Disagreement within Shared
Cooperative Activities
4. Constitutive Conventions
4.1 The Concept of Convention Analyzed
4.2. Kinds of Conventions
4.2.1. Constitutive Conventions
4.2.2. Deep vs. Surface Conventions
4.3. Constitutive Conventions and the Foundations of Law
4.4. Constitution, Cooperation, and Convention
4.4.1. Is Law Like Chess?
4.4.2. Convergence
5. Legal Conventionalism Challenged
5.1. Conformism, Arbitrariness, and Moral Seriousness
5.2. Law as a Discursive Practice
5.3. Getting it Together vs. Getting it Right 13
5.4. The Limits of Formal Conventionalism
CHAPTER 12: Analytic Jurisprudence Challenged
1. Natural-Law Theory’s Ambitions
2. A Natural-law Theory of Practical Reasonableness
2.1. Basic Human Goods
2.2. Principles of Practical Reasonableness and Morality
3. Natural-Law Jurisprudence: Law, Authority, and the Common Good
3.1. A Natural-law Challenge to Methodological Positivism
3.2.. Practical Reasonableness in Community: Common Good and Poiesis
3.3. Positive Law and Legal Reasoning: Dimensions of Natural-Law Positivism
4. Retrieving Normative Jurisprudence
4.1. The Poverty of Methodological Positivism
4.2. Law’s Habitat: The Circumstances of Politics
5. Authoritative Rules, Systematic Integrity, and Argument: Waldron’s Normative
Jurisprudence
5.1. The Normative Case for a Positivist Conception of Law
5.2. Publicity, Systematicity, and the Argumentative Nature of Law
5.3. The Artificial Reason of Law: Judicial Reasoning as an Institution-Shaped
Hybrid
CONCLUDING NOTE
1. Vera Philosophia
2. On the Threshold of a Philosophical Jurisprudence
